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The Justice of Unequal Pay in the UFC: An In-Depth Analysis of the Fighters’
Antitrust Class Action Lawsuit Against the UFC and the Misplaced Support of the
Proposed Muhammad Ali Expansion Act
Abstract
In 2016, the Ultimate Fighting Championships (“UFC”) set the record for the largest sale in sports history.
The UFC, the primary promotion company of the once fringe sport of mixed martial arts (“MMA”) had
matured into a mammoth 4 billion dollar promotion, but not without some growing pains. The league is
replete with controversy, mostly dealing with disgruntled athletes over compensation. Athletes of the UFC
feel that they are being financially exploited and they may be correct. The athletes are choosing different
routes to remedy their pay disparities but they are misguided.
The first course of action chosen by the fighters is litigation, as a group of former UFC fighters have filed a
class action antitrust suit against the UFC. Fighters are also lobbying for legislation in an attempt to
expand the Muhammad Ali Act to regulate MMA as another method of resolution. While both will
ultimately fail to appease the aggrieved athletes, the process may injure the UFC brand, something
fighters may want to avoid. By reviewing similar antitrust disputes in sports and entertainment, the failure
of the lawsuit against the UFC becomes apparent. As for the legislation, the Muhammad Ali Act fell short
in protecting fighters in boxing as it was intended and will have the same ineffectualness in MMA. When
the UFC was purchased in 2016 by WME-IMG, an immense international entertainment conglomerate, it is
not likely the company was ignorant to these unsettled issues. This leads to the conclusion that the
league’s prospects are still bright. It is in the fighters’ and the league’s best interests to quell their innate
divisive temperaments and negotiate a compromise internally.
Part II of this paper discusses the history of MMA, the sport of mixed martial arts. It also evaluates the
evolution and current state of the UFC, the premier league that arranges and promotes the competition of
elite MMA athletes. After a brief explanation of relevant antitrust laws, Part III analyzes the merits of the
class action lawsuit against the UFC. Part IV explores the distinct nature of MMA and why antitrust
enforcement will have varying results from what the athletes hope to achieve. Part V addresses possible
effects of the proposed federal legislation amending the Muhammad Ali Act. Finally, Part VI summarizes
that the antitrust litigation and proposed regulation will fail to redress the fighters’ affliction of their
income but may injure the UFC brand. Thus, imploring the league to be proactive in resolving this issue.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2016, the Ultimate Fighting Championships (“UFC”) set the record for
the largest sale in sports history.1 The UFC, the primary promotion company
of the once fringe sport of mixed martial arts (“MMA”) had matured into a
mammoth 4 billion dollar promotion2, but not without some growing pains.3
The league is replete with controversy, mostly dealing with disgruntled
athletes over compensation.4 Athletes of the UFC feel that they are being
financially exploited and they may be correct.5 The athletes are choosing
different routes to remedy their pay disparities but they are misguided.
The first course of action chosen by the fighters is litigation, as a group
of former UFC fighters have filed a class action antitrust suit against the
UFC.6 Fighters are also lobbying for legislation in an attempt to expand the
Muhammad Ali Act to regulate MMA as another method of resolution.7
While both will ultimately fail to appease the aggrieved athletes, the process
1

See Cindy Boran, UFC Sale is Official at a Reported $4 Billion in One of the Biggest
Sales in Sports History, THE WASHINGTON POST (July 11, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-lead/wp/2016/07/11/ufcs-dana-whiteconfirms-4-billion-sale-the-largest-in-sports-history/?utm_term=.caf3c8e9c6eb (In 2016,
the UFC sold for a record $4 Billion, after grossing an estimated $600 million just the year
before. This marked one of the largest sales in sports history. The sale provided a $3.9
Billion cultivation over a short period since the UFC was purchased in 2000 for only $2
million).
2
Id.
3
See generally Bill Reiter, UFC's Evolution Almost Complete, but Growing Pains Evident
in Jon Jones Fiasco, CBS SPORTS (July 8, 2016),
http://www.cbssports.com/mma/news/ufcs-evolution-almost-complete-but-growing-painsevident-in-jon-jones-fiasco/; see also Anton Tabuena, Several Fighters Outraged About
CM Punk’s $500,000 Pay at UFC 203, SB NATION: BLOODY ELBOW (Sept. 13, 2016, 8:00
AM), http://www.bloodyelbow.com/2016/9/13/12900438/mma-fighters-outraged-aboutcm-punk-500000-pay-ufc-203.
4
Tabuena, supra note 3; see also UFC’s Lorenzo Fertitta: We Pay Fighters Way More
Than Anybody Else (Video), MMA WEEKLY (Dec. 1, 2015),
http://www.mmaweekly.com/ufcs-lorenzo-fertitta-we-pay-fighters-way-more-thananybody-else-video; infra notes 5 & 8.
5
See Brett Okamoto, Michael McDonald Saving Money from Second Job to Continue UFC
Career, ESPN (Jan. 25, 2017), http://www.espn.com/mma/story/_/id/18551901/ufcbantamweight-michael-mcdonald-career-remains-hold-mma; See also Jonathan Snowden,
The Business of Fighting a Look Inside UFC’s Top-Secret Fighter Contract, THE
BLEACHER REPORT (May. 14, 2013), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1516575-thebusiness-of-fighting-a-look-inside-the-ufcs-top-secret-fighter-contract (No one said the life
of a fighter would be easy, but as the UFC has established their legitimacy on the world
stage, it is odd when athletes are not able to compete due to compensation inadequacies.
This is an especially prevalent issue after the company sold for a record 4 billion dollars).
6
Complaint, Le, v. Zuffa, LLC, 216 F. Supp. 3d (D. Nev. 2016).
7
Muhammad Ali Expansion Act, H.R. 5365, 114th Cong. (2016).
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may injure the UFC brand, something fighters may want to avoid. By
reviewing similar antitrust disputes in sports and entertainment, the failure of
the lawsuit against the UFC becomes apparent. As for the legislation, the
Muhammad Ali Act fell short in protecting fighters in boxing as it was
intended and will have the same ineffectualness in MMA.8 When the UFC
was purchased in 2016 by WME-IMG, an immense international
entertainment conglomerate, it is not likely the company was ignorant to
these unsettled issues. This leads to the conclusion that the league’s prospects
are still bright.9 It is in the fighters’ and the league’s best interests to quell
their innate divisive temperaments and negotiate a compromise internally.
Part II of this paper discusses the history of MMA, the sport of mixed
martial arts. It also evaluates the evolution and current state of the UFC, the
premier league that arranges and promotes the competition of elite MMA
athletes. After a brief explanation of relevant antitrust laws, Part III analyzes
the merits of the class action lawsuit against the UFC. Part IV explores the
distinct nature of MMA and why antitrust enforcement will have varying
results from what the athletes hope to achieve. Part V addresses possible
effects of the proposed federal legislation amending the Muhammad Ali Act.
Finally, Part VI summarizes that the antitrust litigation and proposed
regulation will fail to redress the fighters’ affliction of their income but may
injure the UFC brand. Thus, imploring the league to be proactive in resolving
this issue.
II. BACKGROUND -- THE UFC’S ASCENT TO THE THRONE OF MMA
PROMOTION
There exists a common confusion between the difference of MMA and
the UFC. Simply put, MMA is to the UFC, what football is to the National
Football League (“NFL”). In other words, MMA is the sport and the UFC is
a league for the sport.10
Although many people believe MMA is a relative newcomer, it actually
can be traced back to the original Olympic games, and was popular until the
8

See Jason Cruz, Is the Muhammad Ali Act Helping Protect Fighters?, THE WHITE BRONCO
(May 2, 2016), http://thewhitebronco.com/2016/05/is-the-muhammad-ali-act-helpingprotect-fighters. (The proposed regulation did not adequately protect fighters in boxing and
will produce similar frustrations for the athletes in MMA).
9
Noah Kirsch, While Fighters Complain of Low Pay, UFC Sells Itself for $4 Billion,
FORBES (July 15, 2016, 9:05 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/noahkirsch/2016/07/15/while-fighters-complain-of-low-payufc-sells-for-4-billion/#2fab96741bb2; see also Boran, supra note 1.
10
Although the analogy is not perfect because the UFC is not the only league, it is the
prominent league in the sport, where most of the talent and revenue of MMA can be found.
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fall of the Roman Empire in the fourth century.11 It did not emerge in America
until the early 1990’s.12 Even then, MMA only slightly resembled the sport
as it exists today.13 The UFC at its outset, promoted itself as a rule-less, no
holds-barred cage fight without any weight divisions.14 Due to public outcry,
the UFC’s successes of promoting MMA in that fashion were short lived.15
The sport quickly experienced widespread resistance from national and state
legislatures, resulting in cumbersome regulation and in some states, a
complete ban of the sport. 16
In 2001, MMA made drastic progress driven by the successes of the UFC.
The UFC was acquired by Zuffa, LLC, consisting of two Las Vegas casino
moguls and their business partner Dana White.17 Also in 2001, the New
Jersey Athletic Control Board adopted the Unified Rules of Mixed Martial
Arts,18 which would be used to create uniform standards for competition
nationwide.19 With new standards and strong management, the UFC made
great strides, progressing the sport into the 21st century.
After Zuffa purchased the UFC in 200120, the promotion company
aggressively competed to rise to the top as the premiere MMA league.
Ironically, many of the UFC’s actions that contributed to its dominance, are
cited in the chief complaint against them, as anticompetitive conduct.21 Thus,
it is important to see how the UFC became to dominate the promotion of
MMA through acquisition of its numerous early competitors.
In December 2006 the UFC began its incursion on competing leagues by
purchasing World Extreme Fighting (“WEC”)22 and World Fighting Alliance
11

Jordan T. Smith, Fighting for Regulation: Mixed Martial Arts Legislation in the United
States, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 617, 620 (2010).
12
Discover, THE UFC, http://www.ufc.com/discover/ufc (last visited Nov. 17, 2017).
13
Id.
14
Adam Hill, A Timeline of UFC Rules: From No-Holds-Barred to Highly Regulated,
BLEACHER REPORT (Apr. 24, 2013), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1614213-a-timelineof-ufc-rules-from-no-holds-barred-to-highly-regulated.
15
Dave Meltzer, A Look Back at the 1990s Hysteria Which Got MMA Banned in New York,
MMA FIGHTING, (April 3, 2016, 11:00 AM),
http://www.mmafighting.com/2016/4/3/11312322/new-york-was-both-the-first-and-laststate-to-pass-a-law-legalizing.
16
Jeffery B. Same, Breaking the Chokehold: An Analysis of Potential Defenses Against
Coercive Contracts in Mixed Martial Arts, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1057, 1063 (2012).
17
See Smith, supra note 11.
18
N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:46-24 (2017).
19
Hill, supra note 14.
20
See THE UFC, supra note 12.
21
Bill Viola Jr, Who Really Invented MMA Mixed Martial Arts, MMA HISTORY, (Nov. 7,
2017), http://mmahistory.org/who-invented-mma/.
22
Ken Pishna & Ivan Trembow, UFC Buying World Extreme Cagefighting, MMA
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(“WFA”).23 Some of the WFA’s fighters were immediately brought into the
UFC’s roster,24whereas the WEC, an established league that focused on
lighter weight classes, continued to operate for some time separately. 25 In
2010, The WEC’s roster of fighters were either signed with the UFC or
released.26 WEC fighters were mostly enamored at the idea of fighting for
the UFC as their star champion, Uriah Faber was quoted, “I’ve always wanted
this to happen because it felt like I was carrying the brunt of the weight for
the WEC. So now there are new benefits and opportunities.”27 Undoubtedly
the UFC’s motivation for the acquisition was self-profit, but fans were
excited to see an improved product with more fights and greater
competition.28 It would be important to note of the environment in which this
acquisition occurred. It was not a situation where athletes and fans were
unhappy to join the UFC, in fact it was quite the opposite.
The UFC announced they had acquired Pride in 2006.29 In the early days
of MMA, Pride, based in Japan, was the largest and most popular MMA
promotion.30 It had since dwindled and the UFC sought to revamp the Pride

WEEKLY (Dec. 6, 2006), http://www.mmaweekly.com/ufc-buying-world-extremecagefighting-2.
23
UFC Acquires World Fighting Alliance, Inc., MMAJUNKIE (Dec. 11, 2006, 10:05 PM),
http://mmajunkie.com/2006/12/ufc-acquires-world-fighting-alliance-inc.
24
Many fighters of WFA were brought into the UFC roster while others were released. See
Ivan Trembow & Ken Pishna, UFC Buys Select Assets as WFA Ceases Operations, MMA
WEEKLY, (Dec. 11, 2006), http://www.mmaweekly.com/ufc-buys-select-assets-as-wfaceases-operations-2.
25
Ray Hui, The History of the WEC: A Timeline, MMA FIGHTING (Oct. 28, 2010, 1:35
PM), https://www.mmafighting.com/2010/10/28/the-history-of-the-wec-a-timeline.
26
John Buhl, Report: Jamie Varner and Chris Horodecki Released by UFC,
PROMMANOW (Dec. 28, 2010),
http://prommanow.com/2010/12/28/report-jamie-varner-and-chris-horodecki-released-byufc/.
27
Steve Barry, UFC & WEC to Merge in January 2011 (Update II: Jose Aldo Defends
Title at UFC 125), MMA CONVERT (Oct. 28, 2010),
http://www.mmaconvert.com/2010/10/28/the-wec-will-merge-with-the-ufc-in-january2011/.
28
Tim Burke, Analyzing the UFC/WEC Merger After Eight Months, Part One, SB NATION:
BLOODY ELBOW (Aug 11, 2011, 2:37 PM),
http://www.bloodyelbow.com/2011/8/11/2356338/analyzing-the-ufc-wec-merger-aftereight-months.
29
Done deal: UFC Owners Purchase Pride FC, SB NATION: MMA MANIA, (Mar. 27,
2007, 7:40 AM), https://www.mmamania.com/2007/03/27/done-deal-ufc-owners-purchasepride-fc .
30
Rainer Lee, PRIDE Before the Fall: A Look Back at Japan's Greatest MMA
Organization, SB NATION: BLOODY ELBOW, (Oct. 30, 2014, 10:00 AM),
http://www.bloodyelbow.com/2014/10/30/7101575/pride-before-the-fall-a-look-back-atjapans-greatest-mma-organization.
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league and ultimately have it compete with the UFC.31 Those aspirations
may have existed but the rejuvenation of Pride never materialized and the
league’s fighters, as occurred with the WEC’s and WFA’s fighters, were
eventually merged into the UFC roster or released.32
Strikeforce, another competitive league in the United States was
purchased by the UFC in 2011.33 The league was to be operated separately
as WEC did for the first few years post acquisition.34 Within three years, and
after a few botched events, the league folded and its fighters were again
absorbed into the UFC, most notably UFC superstar Ronda Rousey.35 Rhonda
Rousey would grow to become one of the most accomplished fighters in the
UFC and for a moment was referred to as “the world’s most dominant
athlete.”36
The common theme is apparent, the UFC buys out its competition.
Although this not an inherently bad practice nor is it illegal, the fighters
complain of the UFC’s actions were not innocent. The antitrust complaint
alleges the league executed a strategy to control all available talent, sponsors,
venues and broadcasting to weaken and then eliminate competing
promotions, leaving it with a monopoly.37 The alternative view, of course, is
that the UFC consolidated all the talent so that consumers could enjoy the
most entertaining fights. Not surprising, fans recognize that the UFC simply
produces the proverbial “better mousetrap,” resulting in the demise of its
competitors and the league’s legal dominance.
III. ANTITRUST: MERITS OF ANTITRUST SUITS AGAINST ZUFFA, DIFFERENT
SPORTS ENTITIES, AND OTHER INDUSTRIES
Competition is viewed as the driving force in creating superior products
31

The SuperBowl of MMA: UFC vs. Pride Mega-Events, MMAJUNNKIE, (March 28, 2007,
11:54 PM), http://mmajunkie.com/2007/03/the-superbowl-of-mma-ufc-vs-pride-megaevents.
32
Kaz Nagatsuka, UFC Hopes to Shake Up Japan Fight Scene, THE JAPAN TIMES (Feb. 28,
2012), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/sports/2012/02/28/sports/ufc-hopes-to-shake-up-japanfight-scene/#.WI0XTbHMyRs.
33
UFC Purchases Strikeforce; UFC Boss Says Organizations to Operate Independently,
MMA JUNKIE (Mar. 12, 2011, 10:30 PM), http://mmajunkie.com/2011/03/ufc-purchasesstrikeforce.
34
Damon Martin, Ronda Rousey Officially Moving to the UFC; Strikeforce Will Fold After
January Event, MMA WEEKLY (Nov. 9, 2012), http://www.mmaweekly.com/rondarousey-officially-moving-to-the-ufc-strikeforce-will-fold-after-january-event.
35
Id.
36
Jon Wertheim, The Unbreakable Ronda Rousey is the World’s Most Dominant Athlete,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (May 12, 2015), https://www.si.com/mma/2015/05/12/ronda-rouseyufc-mma-fighter-armbar.
37
Complaint, Le v. Zuffa, LLC, 216 F. Supp. 3d 1154 (D. Nev. 2016).
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and lowering costs for consumers.38 Antitrust regulations, such as the
Sherman Act, exist to ensure competition continues in the US economy.39
Monopolies are believed to suppress competition and restrain trade, thus are
prohibited by Section 2 of The Sherman Act.40 The UFC is being accused of
having such a monopoly.41
The UFC is not the first sports entity to come under the scrutiny of
antitrust litigation.42 Sports have a long history of antitrust disputes.43
Baseball holds the unique position of being exempt from antitrust laws.44
Other professional sports leagues have hashed out their disputes through
collective bargaining and litigation.45 Sports leagues are basically joint
ventures of teams agreeing to work together for the sake of competition to
entertain fans.46 Anytime there are large numbers of individuals working
collectively, there is substantial potential for antitrust allegations. 47 The
essential collusion of athletes, teams and leagues, as well as production and
distribution channels, are all to be balanced with healthy competition.48
The antitrust lawsuit pending against the UFC alleges a Section 2
violation of the Sherman Act which prohibits monopolies or attempts to
monopolize any parts of trade or commerce.49 The violation contains two
conjunctive elements.50 First, the entity has to acquire a monopoly and
second, there must be the requisite intent to achieve and maintain that
monopoly power.51 Achievements in enterprise leading to possible
monopolies should not be stifled as long as the successes were achieved
legally and do not result in a restraint of trade and competition. In other
words, monopolies that occur due to the company’s natural innovations and
expansion resulting from creating a superior product are permitted. 52 The
38

Antitrust and Labor Law Issues in Sports, US LEGAL,
https://sportslaw.uslegal.com/antitrust-and-labor-law-issues-in-sports/ (last visited Nov. 17,
2017).
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Jon Barr, Fighters Claim UFC Restricts Earnings, ESPN (Dec. 16, 2014),
http://www.espn.com/mma/story/_/id/12037883/antitrust-lawsuit-filed-ufc-parentcompany-claims-monopoly.
42
See generally Antitrust and Labor Law Issues in Sports, supra note 39.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
SPORTS AND ANTITRUST LAW 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014).
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
15 U.S.C. §2.
50
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1996).
51
Id.
52
Id.; see also Antitrust and Labor Law Issues in Sports, supra note 38.
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second element of intent is often the most challenging for plaintiffs to prove,
but courts have determined if the motivation is something more than
competition on its merits, it may be a violation.53 Once a plaintiff can
establish the first two elements, he must still prove the antitrust violation
caused injury to competition and specifically to the plaintiff.54 To fend off
the allegations, defendants must prove their actions were actually
procompetitive or for legitimate business purposes.55 The court then
determines whether the defendant’s actions unfairly destroy competition
itself or just are aggressive tactics for profit.56 Often judges engage in a
balancing test of the procompetitive versus the anticompetitive effects of the
alleged monopoly.57
Applying these elements directly to the antitrust lawsuit against the UFC;
the fighters must show the UFC has monopoly power of the MMA market
and that the company intentionally acquired that monopoly by engaging in a
strategy to destroy competition. Once the fighters prove those two things,
then they must show that the UFC’s strategy and monopoly caused the
fighters’ financial injury. To defend against these allegations, the UFC could
try to say they do not have a monopoly but the better strategy is to claim the
market dominance is the result of a better product and the concentration of
talent is best for the sport. The following sections will assess the merits of the
alleged antitrust practices committed by the UFC beginning with Part (i) in
broadcasting, then Part (ii) with venues, and finally in Part (iii) with the talent.
A. Anticompetitive Strategy in Broadcasting
The UFC is accused of engaging in unfair practices by forcing
broadcasting companies into exclusive deals in a strategy to restrict
competing promotions’ ability to reach consumers.58 Broadcasting is often a
highly competitive market for sports leagues.59 The more promotions can get
their product on the air, the more consumers can enjoy the sport.60 This in
turn incentivizes sponsors to pay more, creating more revenue for the leagues,
teams, players, etc. and, ultimately, an even better product61
53

Aspen Skiing v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 602–04 (1985).
SPORTS AND ANTITRUST LAW at 46.
55
Major League Baseball Props, Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 317 (2d Cir. 2008).
56
Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993).
57
Id.
58
Le v. Zuffa, LLC, 216 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1161 (D. Nev. 2016).
59
Id.
60
See Anthony Crupi, Sports Now Accounts for 37% of Broadcast TV Ad Spending, ADAGE
(Sept. 10, 2015), http://adage.com/article/media/sports-account-37-percent-all-tv-addollars/300310/.
61
Id.
54
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A similar dispute of broadcasting rights and an alleged restraint of trade
can be found in the case of United States Football League v. National
Football League.62 There the United States Football League (“UFSL”)
alleged that the NFL had obtained a monopoly power over television rights
in violation of the Sherman Act.63 The USFL claimed that because the NFL
had exclusive deals with the principal television networks, it had essentially
blocked out the USFL, not giving the league the ability to compete.64 The
court found in favor of NFL, stating the existence of NFL contracts with three
networks was not sufficient to claim an antitrust violation.65 The court also
noted the failure of the USFL was due to its own deficient business dealings.66
Despite this favorable ruling, the legislature would later carve out an antitrust
exception for the professional football with the Sports Broadcasting Act 67 to
allow for greater collusion amongst franchises without fear of violation
antitrust regulation.68
In considering the UFC, the promotion only broadcasts on Fox Networks
and on PPV as well as streaming on its own UFC’s Fight Pass online.69
Furthermore UFC’s top competitor, Bellator, is owned by Viacom.70 Viacom
is recognized as the fourth largest media conglomerate in the world. 71 In
today’s abundance of available broadcasting avenues, from the internet to
cable and the existence of legitimate competition with Bellator, the assertion
of a UFC monopoly in broadcasting is weak.

62

United States Football League v. National Football League, 842 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir
1988).
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 1354–55.
66
Id. at 1350.
67
15 U.S.C. §§ 1291–1295.
68
Jack Moore, Throwback Thursday: The TV Deal that Created Modern Sports, VICE
SPORTS, (June 11, 2015, 2:38 PM), https://sports.vice.com/en_ca/article/throwbackthursday-the-tv-deal-that-created-modern-sports.
69
Jed Meshew, Morning Report: UFC Looking to Quadruple its TV Broadcasting Deal
Up to $450 Million Dollars, MMA FIGHTING (Nov. 29, 2016, 8:00 AM),
http://www.mmafighting.com/2016/11/29/13773374/morning-report-ufc-looking-toquadruple-its-tv-broadcasting-deal-up.
70
Kale Havervold, Three of the Biggest Competitors of the UFC, THE HISTORY LOCKER,
http://historylocker.com/three-of-the-biggest-competitors-to-the-ufc/ (last visited Nov. 17,
2017).
71
Adam Guillen Jr., UFC Quick Quote: Bellator and its $5 Billion Owner, Viacom can
Afford to Pay Eddie Alvarez, SB NATION: MMA MANIA, (Jan. 25, 2013, 12:19 PM)
http://www.mmamania.com/2013/1/25/3914504/bellator-5-billion-viacom-ufc-pay-eddiealvarez-mma.
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B. Anticompetitive Strategy in Venues
The complaint also alleges the UFC has obtained and maintained its
monopoly power through exclusive contracts with venues.72 For the plaintiff
to have a successful claim under this theory of a Sherman Act violation, he
must show first, the defendant’s control over an essential facility; second, that
the plaintiff cannot reasonably duplicate the facility; third, the rejection of
use of the facility and, finally, the ability by the plaintiff to use said facility.73
Similar allegations were made in Hetch v. Pro-Football, Inc.,74 where
promoters sought to bring a team from the American Football League to the
stadium where the Washington Redskins home games were played. 75 The
contract between the NFL and RFK Stadium excluded any other professional
football team from using the site.76 The court held “where facilities cannot
practicably be duplicated by would-be competitors, those in possession of
them must allow them to be shared on fair terms. It was considered an illegal
restraint on trade to foreclose on the scarce facility.”77
This case can hardly foreclose on the UFC’s exclusive venue agreements
due to the unparalleled nature of the venues. The capacity necessary for a
MMA promotion is far less than for NFL games. NFL stadiums average a
capacity upwards of 69,00078 whereas the UFC’s arenas are sub 20,000.79
The average attendance at UFC Pay Per View events are between 10,000 and
20,00080 people, whereas NFL games’ average attendance is 68,400.81
Professional football teams would have a much more difficult time finding
equivalent venues and MMA promotions do not have the same fortuitous
obstacle.
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C. Anticompetitive Strategy in Talent
The primary source of the alleged grievances in the antitrust complaint
against the UFC is the treatment of its athletes, specifically fighter pay.
Though the complaint alleges antitrust violations injured competing
promotion companies, the plaintiffs who brought the suit were not those
failed promotion companies but ex UFC fighters.82 They complain the UFC
signed its fighters to one-sided, long term contracts to keep the them from
competing in other leagues.83 According to the fighters, if the UFC has all of
the talent and the UFC refuses to work with other leagues, those leagues will
undoubtedly fail.84 This result creates a monopoly for the UFC so it can stifle
competition and fighter pay.85 Refusing to work with competitors is not an
antitrust violation, but it can be.86 The Supreme Court noted that “we have
been very cautious in recognizing such exceptions, because of the uncertain
virtue of forced sharing and the difficulty of identifying and remedying
anticompetitive conduct by a single firm.”87 The Court here acknowledged
competing enterprises can refuse to work together in order to starve out its
competitors.
This general notion that monopolists do not have to engage in business
with would be competitors has been upheld numerous times in the courts,
notably in Morris Communications Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc.88 Here the
Professional Golfers’ Association of America (“PGA”) required journalists
to delay publishing tournament scores.89 A media company wanted to use
those scores to generate more viewers and therefore additional revenue.
However, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the unfair practice claim against the
PGA.90 Instead, it held that, as long as the actions were for legitimate
business purposes and not to restrain trade, the media company was not able
to freeride off the PGA’s effort to compile, produce and release their product
as they saw fit.91
When the UFC signs fighters to long term deals, it would be difficult to
say that the UFC’s intent was to eliminate competing promotions and not for
82
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its own procompetitive reasons. The UFC has many legitimate motives to
sign all the talent to long-term contracts. For one, having all the best fighters
under a single promotion allows that promotion to set those fighters against
each other, without the difficulty of having two promotion companies work
together. This was the issue causing the delay for the Mayweather-Pacquiao
fight. Floyd Mayweather and Manny Pacquiao reigned as co-champions for
nearly a decade before finally stepping in the ring as foes.92 The bout was
highly anticipated by fans wanting to see the two best boxers compete, but
due to promotional disputes the fight came years too late.93
Another procompetitive incentive for the UFC to have fighters in longterm deals, is the ability to feel more comfortable making large monetary
investments in promotion and marketing to build stars, such as Connor
McGregor and Rhonda Rousey.94 Because of those stars, the UFC has been
able to expand further into the mainstream markets, thus creating more
revenue for the UFC and presumptively its fighters.95 If the UFC can prove
the procompetitive nature of locking their fighters into contracts, where they
were not able to compete in other leagues, they should be free from liability
for antitrust violations.96
The UFC used several clauses to control their stable of fighters, most
notably the “retirement clause,” the “champions clause” and the “ancillary
rights clause.”
92
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The retirement clause states:
“If at any time during the Term, Fighter decides to retire from mixed
martial arts or other professional fighting competition," the clause
begins, "then ZUFFA may, at its election, (i) suspend the Term for the
period of such retirement; (ii) declare that ZUFFA has satisfied its
obligation to promote all future Bouts to be promoted by ZUFFA
hereunder, without any compensation due to Fighter therefore; or (iii)
elect to provide Fighter with notice of an Acceleration.”97
This clause gives the UFC three options in its contractual obligations to
athletes when the athlete retires.98 Clause (i) allows the UFC to suspend the
contract, owning the rights to the fighter in perpetuity.99 Therefore, should
the fighter come out of retirement, he cannot just go join another league.
Clause (ii) allows the UFC to consider fights offered while in retirement as
satisfying their contractual obligations. 100 And clause (iii) gives the UFC the
ability to accelerate and end the contract, therefore releasing the UFC and the
fighter from any obligation.101
The champions clause states:
“If, at the expiration of the Term, Fighter is then a UFC champion, the
Term shall automatically be extended for the period commencing on
the Termination Date and ending on the later of (i) one (1) year from
the Termination Date; or (ii) the date on which Fighter has participated
in three (3) bouts promoted by ZUFFA, regardless of weight class or
title, following the Termination Date ("Extension Term").”102
This clause gives the UFC the power to extend an athlete’s contract for
one year after winning a championship or for three more fights, whichever
comes first. It is not apparent what happens if the champion keeps winning.103
At least one commentator has even suggested a possible 13th Amendment
violation, comparing it to involuntary servitude.104 Allowing the UFC to
control a fighter after he becomes champion; advantages the promotion and
fans for the following reasons.
First, the fighter will not be able to bring his championship status and
97
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fame to another league.105 This incentivizes the UFC to build more
promotional value behind that specific fighter, without fear of losing out on
its investment. Secondly, if the UFC cannot control the champion, not only
would this monetarily dissuade the UFC from building stars, it would
complicate divisions with vacant titles and substitute champions. Each
division must have a champion and if one leaves, then the contending athletes
cannot compete to become the “true champion.” Situations like this occur
when a fighter moves up in weight or cannot defend his title due to injury and
retains champion status, while other compete to become interim
champions.106 Too many champions leads to confusion for fans and dilutes
the glory of being a champion. Similar effects have already occurred in
boxing, caused by multiple governing bodies awarding numerous
championship belts and causing decline in viewership.107
Finally, the Ancillary Rights Clause grants the UFC the exclusive rights
to the athlete’s identity as a UFC fighter. The UFC would argue that the
promotion makes the fighters into an entity, a character so to speak, which
the UFC in turn would like to profit from and it alone. It makes sense to not
want to put massive amounts of money behind a fighter, building up his
brand, only to have him then go to a competing league and use all the fame
to drive the successes of other leagues. The UFC’s general counsel Lawrence
Epstein stated the following in the defense of this clause, “We're trying to
capture the rights that can emanate from the fighter's participation in our
event. The video that we capture of the pre-event, the post-event, the event
itself—we want to be able to exploit that in any way we possibly can. At the
end of the day, that's the only real asset that the UFC has.”108
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Hollywood’s Control Over Talent During the Golden Era

Hollywood studios made a similar argument during Hollywood’s Golden
Era in which the studios practiced the same control over their talent to
generate more revenue.109 In the 1930’s and 40’s the entire film industry was
run by the five major studios.110 The actors themselves were controlled under
the contract system, where they were compelled into long term contracts,
(usually seven years) at the very beginning of their careers, prior to knowing
their worth.111 The contracts could and would be extended for numerous
reasons, such as when the actors turned down a role if they felt it
inappropriate for their skill level.112 Even if the actors were unable to work
for a period of time due to illness, the contract could be extended.113 The
actors were not allowed to work with other studios while under contract, if
they thought they could possibly make more money or they preferred a
particular role. 114 The actors could be loaned out to competing studios, but
the actors would receive no additional compensation and were not at liberty
to refuse.115 If the actor protested, the actor’s contract would be suspended
without pay, until agreeing to work again.116
Hollywood’s chokehold on its talent inevitably came to end with De
Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures.117 In this case, the studio exercised a
number of the previously mentioned unsavory practices, such as loaning the
actress to other studios, under using her talent, and suspending and extending
her contract.118 On the advice of her agent and lawyer, she filed suit and,
surprising many, she won.119 As a result of this decision, actors and actress
were able to work freely at any studio that suited them, whether that be for
monetary reasons or for preferred roles.120 This case would seem to be
favorable to the athletes bringing suit against the UFC. The fighters believe
that if they could move freely amongst leagues their value would increase.
Sadly, their theory is flawed.
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IV. ANTITRUST IN THE UFC IS DISTINCT FROM OTHER SPORTS AND
INDUSTRIES AND FOR GOOD REASON
The analogy previously presented of the UFC being to MMA, what the
NFL is to football is not perfect because the NFL consists of teams of players,
and the UFC consists of individual athletes. This distinction is an important
one because one of the most litigated areas of antitrust issues in sports is the
non-statutory labor exemption.121 It is Congress’s intention that judicial
intervention not be the immediate resolution for all labor disputes.122 It is the
preferred federal labor policy that such disputes be resolved through
collective bargaining and economic pressures.123 Leagues such as the
National Football League, Major League Baseball, National Basketball
Association, and the National Hockey League all have player unions that
lobby for the interests of the athletes. The judiciary will do its best to avoid
interfering with deals created between players’ unions and their leagues, but
it does happen.124 Attempts to unionize fighters have been under way for
years but have failed to materialize.125 The UFC’s president, Dana White,
mocked the unions for battling amongst each themselves126 and called into
question the unions’ leadership and motivations in creating such unions. 127
He is quoted saying, “as a fighter there’s a lot of people that are trying to put
their hand in your pocket. Be careful whose hand you let go in your
pocket.”128 Nevertheless, because fighters currently have no legitimate union,
it is not necessary to examine the non-statutory labor exemption when it
comes to the UFC and MMA.129
Since the collective bargaining examination does not apply, because the
UFC consists of nonunion individual athletes and the league does not consist
of teams, a more appropriate comparison again comes from Hollywood.
During the same period of the aforementioned contract system, those same
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studios were exercising monopoly power over the entire industry.130 The
“block-booking” tactic was the greatest source of controversy practiced by
the monopolist studios.131 “Block-booking,” was the studio refusing to sell a
movie individually to a theater, but rather would require the theater to
purchase a block of movies.132 This was advantageous to the studios because
it allowed for one good movie to carry the profits for the rest of films in the
block.133
These major studios felt the pressures of the new Franklin D. Roosevelt
administration and knew their monopoly power and predatory practices
would be short lived.134 The film industry made the same monetary pleas as
the UFC’s Lawrence Epstein did above, stating their practices were essential
and the business would not be economically viable without them.135 But in
1945 the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) brought suit against the studios for
violations of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.136 The suit reached the Supreme
Court in United States v. Paramount Pictures137 and ruled in favor of the
DOJ, citing the many ways in which the studios violated antitrust laws.138
The block-booking maneuver was key to the government’s argument. The
Court determined a film should be judged on its own merits, and the practice
would suppress the quality of films and entertainment as a whole.139
In De Haviland, the actors and actresses wanted to be free to work with
competing studios.140 In Paramount, the DOJ was dissatisfied with studios
working collectively; suppressing the quality of films.141 Because of the
decisions in Paramount and De Haviland, the major studios were stripped of
much of their power and many independent producers emerged. 142 These
cases are useful in considering the alleged antitrust violations of the UFC and
the results that may come if the lawsuit is successful.
Should the UFC lose the antitrust lawsuit, the consequences for fighters
130
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would differ from Hollywood’s talent. MMA athletes want to compete in the
UFC and if they are a good MMA fighter, “it’s the UFC or nothing.” 143 All
the premier athletes fight in the UFC, so there is no issue of quality and it is
the only league an athlete can hope to make substantial income.144 Divesting
the UFC of their concentrated control would damage the product. In boxing,
the power is vastly splintered with numerous regulatory bodies creating
dozens of championship belts in each weight class, frustrating even the most
loyal fan.145 Boxing’s numerous promoters also add to the vexation. The stale
Mayweather-Pacquiao fight situation146 would never occur in the UFC
because the UFC is responsive to what fans want.147 These promotional
battles plague boxing.148 The UFC holds a great advantage in having absolute
control over all the athletes and promotional aspects. The UFC can make the
fights fans want. Should the antitrust lawsuit succeed, the UFC’s absolute
authority would no longer exist. Competing athletes of the UFC desire more
money, they want a bigger percentage of the league’s income, but they must
realize that the athletes’ income is tied to the successes of the only legitimate
MMA league, the UFC.
V. PROPOSED LEGISLATION IN THE MUHAMMAD ALI EXPANSION ACT
The Muhammad Ali Expansion Act149 is another proposed solution to
many of the athletes’ grievances.150 H.R. 5365 was introduced into the house
143
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in March of 2016.151 The legislation would take protections afforded to
boxers and expand them to many other combat sports, including MMA.152
For athletes the greatest contention to expand the bill are the financial
protections the regulation is meant to provide. 153 It is helpful to evaluate the
effects of the legislation on boxers and how it failed to accomplish its goals.
By doing this, it gives insight of how it will fail to protect MMA athletes as
they hope. The following sections will discuss the pertinent provisions of the
proposed bill.
A. Coercive Contract Provision
Section 6307(b) of the Muhammad Ali Act protects fighters against
coercive contracts by making them unenforceable.154 Coercive contracts are
of course already unenforceable under common law. The legislation goes on
to define the coercive contracts provisions often used to take advantage of
boxers in order to make them readily identifiable. A coercive contract is
described in this section as a contract that grants a boxer’s rights to a promoter
when that boxer is either already under contract to another promoter or grants
those rights to the promoter for longer than 12 months. If the granting of those
rights is a condition precedent to the participation in a professional boxing
match, it will be considered coercive.155
This section of the legislation emerged in response to a situation that arose
in the mid-nineties involving Mike Tyson, Evander Holyfield, and Don
King.156 Then heavyweight champion Mike Tyson was promoted by Don
King and Holyfield wished to challenge Mike Tyson for the belt.157 In order
for Holyfield to be granted the fight, he was forced to sign with Don King as
his promoter even though he already had one.158 This arrangement would be
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unenforceable under the Muhammad Ali Act.159
The following examples prove how the coercive contract clause has been
substantially legally ineffectual in boxing. The first example presents how
courts ignore clear violations of the law. The second exposes the lack of
redressability a court can provide, when there is a clear violation due the
monetary and time limitations of fighters.
In Lewis v Rahman160, Hussein Rahman, a then-contender who had
suffered recent losses,161 signed to fight the heavyweight champion, Lennox
Lewis.162 Rahman was forced to sign a provision requiring him to fight in a
rematch under Lewis’s promoter should the champion, Lewis, lose their first
bout.163 The deal also required that if Rahman chose to fight prior to their
rematch and lost, the opponent would be under Lewis’s promoter as well.164
Not surprisingly, however, when Rahman pulled off the upset win, he was
not eager for the rematch and instead wanted to fight an interim bout against
another opponent.165 Lewis demanded an immediate rematch and sued for
injunctive relief and breach of contract.166 Rahman challenged the
enforceability of the contract, citing the provisions above as violations under
the Muhammad Ali Act167 prohibiting coercive contracts.168 The court,
persuaded by the aging fallen champ and his endearing pleas to recover his
title before retirement, ruled in favor of Lewis, ignoring the violations.169
The other example revealing the ineffectiveness of the prohibited
coercive contract provision occurred when Bermane Stiverne sued Don
King.170 Stiverne had recently beaten Ray Austin in the World Boxing
Council’s (“WBC”) title eliminator to become the number one contender. 171
Ray Austin was under Don King’s promotion.172 Prior to fighting Austin,
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Stiverne was forced to sign an exclusive promotion agreement with King.173
After beating Austin, Stiverne wanted to fight Vitali Klitschko for the
heavyweight title and foresaw King’s interference with the deal.174 Stiverne
sued, claiming he had been coerced into an exclusionary contract with Don
King Promotions.175 He sought a preliminary injunction.176 Don King fired
back with numerous claims against Stiverne and his manager, including
breach of contract and tortious inference.177 Stiverne’s request for a
preliminary injunction was denied and subsequently he dismissed his case.178
This is an all-too common story; fighters have neither the time nor the
money to battle drawn out litigation when their careers are so short lived. In
contrast, the pockets of promoters are often much deeper, their time frame
much longer, and they are generally more powerful.179 If the regulations were
to be expanded to MMA, the promoters would still be able to draft contracts
with these provisions and continue to require fighters sign them. Promoters
might not be able to enforce them in the unlikely event the fighter can afford
both the time and money to sue. This is likely a gamble many promoters
would take. In other words, unless and until courts invalidate these
provisions, unscrupulous promoters can continue to try to take advantage of
fighters. Absent a proper interpretation and enforcement, such provisions are
no protection.
In the event the legislation is expanded and properly enforced this
provision would greatly affect MMA, specifically the UFC. Anytime fighters
were nearing the end of their contracts and wanted to sign for another fight,
the UFC would not be able to enforce a new contract for greater than 12
months, should it be signed as a condition precedent to that fight happening.
The aforementioned championship and retirement clauses would be limited
by this provision as well. This provision of the proposed regulation would be
beneficial to the high-profile athletes because it allows them to renegotiate
more regularly and, in theory, increase their market share.180 On the other
hand, it may hurt the fighters just starting out who would prefer long-term
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deals.181 This is especially true in an industry rife with injuries causing
extended periods of inactivity.182
B. Manager Promoter Firewall Provision
Section eight of the Muhammad Ali Act provides for a firewall between
managers and promoters for specific types of fighters.183 It makes it illegal
for a promoter to have any financial interest in the management of a boxer or
for a manager to have any financial interests in the promotion of a boxer. The
provision’s application is limited to boxers fighting ten rounds or more.184
The purpose of this provision was to make sure a fighter’s manager and
promoter are working independently for the benefit of the fighter and avoid
any self-dealing.
This provision has also, for the most part, been toothless in boxing. Alan
Haymon, one of boxing most prominent managers,185 emerged on the boxing
scene in 2015 with a new promotion company, Premier Boxing
Championship (‘PBC’).186 PBC is technically not Haymon’s promotion, as
he is not a promoter but a manager, and that would no doubt be a violation of
the Muhammad Ali Act.187 Nonetheless, PBC is owned by Haymon Sports,
LLC.188 Haymon manages over 200 fighters, most if not all who also fight on
PBC promotions, but Haymon claims he is nothing more than an advisor for
PBC.189 Most anyone can see through this thinly veiled attempt to skirt the
Muhammad Ali Act, but when sued for using “sham promoters” he has so far
been untouchable.190
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Another defect of this provision is that it only applies to fighters fighting
ten rounds or more.191 Boxing matches can range from four to twelve
rounds.192 Four rounders will be for the novice fighters just entering
professional boxing while the twelve rounders are reserved for championship
bouts.193 The limited application means it does not protect the most
vulnerable fighters. Those who are involved in bouts of 10 rounds or more,
are probably well established and, thus, in a better position to protect
themselves.194
The legislation is altered in its application to MMA as to include all
fighters. MMA bouts are usually three five-minute rounds, unless it is a
championship, which are five five-minute rounds.195 The proposed
legislation would apply to “mixed martial arts competition or other combat
sport competition scheduled for 11 minutes or more.”196 This will apply the
firewall provision to all MMA fighters, promoters, and managers. Ignore the
implications for the UFC if any, because UFC does not manage fighters, they
promote MMA events.197 Though it could be argued the UFC controls
fighters similar to managers.198
The greatest impact may be felt by local MMA promotions.199 Most
MMA fighters do not start in the UFC; they start by fighting at local and
regional events. Very often the promoter of those local shows also owns a
gym, whose fighters will typically fill the card of the promoter’s show.200 The
promoter’s job is to sell tickets. Promoters do this by getting local fighters on
the fight card. Local fighters are better able to sell tickets, by bringing family
and friends. Often that promoter is also a gym owner and will act as a
manager for those same unaccomplished fighters.201 This provision would
prohibit this structure, causing local and small promotions to dwindle into
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extinction.202 This will significantly weaken the talent base of MMA athletes
for the UFC to scout from, adversely affecting the sport.203
C. Financial Disclosure Provision
The Muhammad Ali Act also contains a financial disclosure provision
which states that the promoter shall not receive any compensation until he
provides the fighter with
“(1) the amounts of any compensation or consideration that a
promoter has contracted to receive from such match; (2) all fees,
charges, and expenses that will be assessed by or through the promoter
on the boxer pertaining to the event, including any portion of the
boxer’s purse that the promoter will receive, and training expenses;
and (3) any reduction in a boxer’s purse contrary to a previous
agreement between the promoter and the boxer or a purse bid held for
the event.”204
This provision has been the subject of much litigation in boxing. For
instance, gold medalist Olympian and current light heavyweight champion,
Andre Ward, brought suit against his promoter in 2014 for such a violation.205
The lawsuit was preceded by two arbitration disputes between fighter and
promoter, both decided in favor of the promoter.206 Presumably because
Ward was unhappy with the arbitration results, he sued and was eventually
released to fight with another promoter.207 Whether this violation was the
source of Ward’s grievance or just something he could use against the
promoter to get out of his promotion deal, he ended up all but falling out of
the ranks, fighting only three times in thirty-six months due to the dispute.208
The time and expense of litigation make these solutions impractical to most
fighters.209
Not only are the legal avenues of resolution impractical for fighters, the
actual logistics of disclosing the financials to fighters can be an unworkable
202
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task for a promoter. Promoters make a great deal of their income from pay
per view and ticket sales at the gate, and it can take months to determine these
numbers.210 The promoter may also have long term deals with foreign
broadcasters and exclusive venue deals that pay out over set periods of
time.211 Calculating the amount attributable to a specific fighter is a
perplexing task. Furthermore, the regulation requires the promoter disclose
the gross amount of revenue and not the net, giving a misleading value to
fighters.212
One purpose of the financial disclosure provision is to assist boxers assess
their market value. Unfortunately for the fighters, the disclosure provision
lacks a time for which the disclosure must be made. 213 Due to this inept
drafting, the purpose to assist fighters is frustrated. This was the source of a
dispute with professional boxer Chris Algieri.214 Algieri had unexpected
successes in two major upset victories in a row after a less than stellar start
to his career.215 Using the momentum of those wins, Algieri signed to fight
Manny Pacquiao for his highest pay day at $1.67 million.216 He lost that fight
against Pacquiao and then went on to lose again, and then sneak in a win
before setting a fight with Olympian Errol Spence, Jr.217 Algieri demanded
the disclosures prior to the fight with Spence but the promoter refused, which
he could do as the Act is silent on when the disclosure must be made, putting
the fighter at a great disadvantage.218 In fact, it is common for a promoter to
make disclosures at the last minute, giving the fighter little opportunity to
renegotiate prior to his or her bout. 219 This is a strategy used by promoters to
eliminate the chance the fighter will demand more money, and there is
nothing illegal about this underhanded method of disclosure.220
The required disclosure provision serves several purposes; the one which
athletes are most interested in concerns their market value.221 The provision
210
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provides more transparency, usually considered a good thing. Fighters see
how much money their names bring to the promotion so, in theory, they
should have a better idea of their worth and in return they can demand an
appropriate amount money.222 As much as the disclosure provision provides
essential information, the method of delivery required and recourse for
fighters if its deviated, prove it is both inadequate and impractical.
D. Independent Ranking Requirement Provision
The Muhammad Ali Act requires that there be an independent ranking
system.223 In boxing, the governing sanctioning bodies are required to report
justifications for the rank of fighters.224 The rankings often determine who
fights who, due to mandatory challenger provisions in boxing. Because
fighter rankings are subject to discretion and often do not adhere to objective
determinations, they are easily manipulated by persuasion, especially the
financial kind.225 The Muhammad Ali Act has not been successful in
eradicating boxing of this sort of corruption226
In the UFC, the UFC itself controls the ranking system and has shown it
is willing to arbitrarily lower fighters’ rank as a form of punishment. 227 Jon
Fitch is said to be an example of this mistreatment.228 After winning fifteen
straight fights, Fitch fought for the title and lost.229 Soon thereafter, Fitch
battled with the UFC over a video game deal that lead to his contract being
terminated.230 Although they finally agreed to a deal and he was reinstated in
the UFC,231 he only won the battle, but lost the war as he was subsequently
forced to fight on undercards, a practice generally reserved for the less
achieved fighters.232
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The UFC does attempt at an independent ranking system, though its
merely for show. The organization uses media members to vote on the
fighters’ ranks.233 Determining who is the better fighter is a daunting task in
considering all the variables of a fighter’s skills. The rankings are highly
subjective and often produce perplexing results where fighters will be
outranked by a fighter they had previously defeated.234 Furthermore the
rankings mean nothing more than bragging rights for fighters or to assist fans
in following along. In the UFC, there is no such thing as a mandatory
challenger. The rankings in the UFC have little effect on who fights who, as
that is in the discretion of the UFC, who will put on the fight that fans most
want to see.
VI. CONCLUSION
The fighters are unhappy because they think they are not getting paid
enough. The UFC enjoys the status quo and so prefers things stay the same.
The fans, and they must be considered, are happy if they continue getting big
fights. The fans are the ultimate consumer and those responsible for driving
revenue for the UFC. They should be the main concern of not only the UFC,
but of the fighters. This is what makes the lawsuit and the athlete’s support
for the proposed regulation so perplexing. Both will undoubtedly hurt the
UFC and in turn hurt the fans and inevitably the athletes.
This is not to say the UFC is perfect and should be left alone. There is
debate over what percentage of the UFC’s revenue is going to the fighter.235
Some claim it is as low as seven percent, others say it is as high as thirty five
percent.236 Boxing promoter Bob Arum claims in boxing, the percentage
going to the fighter can be as high as eighty percent.237 Maybe none of those
percentages are reasonable for either the UFC or the fighters,238 but they must
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find a happy medium.
Fighter’s pay is not an antitrust issue and the Muhammad Ali Act does
not address it. As it stands, the Muhammad Ali Act has proven ineffective.
The legislation was not able to help the fighters in boxing as it was supposed
to. It is ludicrous to expect the legislation to help the MMA athletes in its
expanded version. Even when it was first enacted, its own drafters felt the
legislation was deficient.239 The MMA community, if it feels that regulation
is necessary, should create its own rules, appropriate for the dynamics of the
sport and not just lazily expand an already failing Muhammad Ali Act. As
for the antitrust suit, the fighters should assess the end game and what it is
they want. Do they want to fight for other leagues? Probably not. But they
want more money, so what is the best way to accomplish that goal? It is not
to hurt the UFC brand, which they are a part of. In order to avoid further
frustration for fighter, fan, and company, the UFC must be proactive in
resolving these issues with their athletes, as they are the lifeblood of the sport.
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